Health Law Comes of Age: Economics and Ethics in a Changing Industry by Stromberg, Clifford D
Health Law Comes of Age: Economics
and Ethics in a Changing Industry
Law, Medicine, and Forensic Science (3d ed.). By William J.
Curran and E. Donald Shapiro. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1982. Pp. xxix, 1132. $28.00.
Clifford D. Stromberg
-
Health law is booming. This field of legal practice hardly existed
twenty years ago; it is now becoming one of the more important legal
specialties. Until recently, practice in the "medico-legal" field was largely
limited to the defense of hospitals and physicians in malpractice actions
and to occasional issues in criminal law. Today, "health law"1 is a diverse
and burgeoning enterprise. The National Health Lawyers Association
alone boasts more than 2200 members. There are also specialty groups of
hospital lawyers, food and drug lawyers, mental health lawyers, and
others. Professional journals, books, courses, and symposia on health law
are proliferating.
These developments reflect the dynamic growth of the health industry.
Health care is now the nation's third largest industry (after construction
and agriculture), with national health expenditures that exceeded $280
billion in 1981. Health costs have leaped from about 4.0 percent of our
gross national product in 1960, to 5.9 percent in 1970, and to 9.8 percent
in 1981. Health care constitutes about one-third of the service sector and
is the fastest growing portion of this fastest growing sector of our
economy.2
The recent surge in health law practice has also been spurred by enact-
ment of a formidable array of laws and regulations concerning Meditare/
t The author is a partner at Dorsey & Whitney, Washington, D.C. He was formerly Deputy
Executive Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and.Human Services, and a consultant on health law
and policy to the Federal Trade Commission.
1. The term is significant. The traditional terms "forensic medicine" and "medical jurisprudence"
betoken the fact that health issues rose to legal significance almost exclusively in the limited context of
proving facts (such as paternity, insanity, cause of death, or malpractice) in court. As the more general
term "health law" suggests, there is now a substantial body of law governing the relations of health
care providers, professionals, third-party payors, and patients in broader contexts.
2. See Reilly & Legge, The Embattled Hospital: Cost Control Measures Versus Imperatives for
Expansion, 7 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 254, 255 (1982); Federal Trade Comm'n, Health Services
Policy Session, 1-5 (June 5, 1979); Cost of Health Care Rose to $287 Billion in 1981, Wash. Post,
July 27, 1982, at A2, col. 4.
The Yale Law Journal
Medicaid reimbursement, health planning, the Hill-Burton program for
hospital construction, Professional Standards Review Organizations, fed-
erally qualified Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), state hospi-
tal rate setting, and so on. State and federal reimbursement rules for
health providers alone rival the Internal Revenue Code regulations in
complexity.
Finally, the emergence of health law as a distinct field of practice has
been aided, I believe, by a perception that many of the most challenging
issues concerning law and society arise in this area. Legal questions as to
the allocation of scarce medical resources, rights to health care, abortion,
genetic engineering, treatment of mental patients, definition of death, and
prolongation of life have spurred great public and professional interest in
recent years. For all these reasons, health law has emerged as a specialty
with both an economic impetus and, if not yet overall intellectual coher-
ence, then at least a core of principled concerns.
In this context, publication of the third edition of Curran and Shapiro's
Law, Medicine, and Forensic Science' is timely and important. This is a
superb book, of great significance for both practitioners and students in
the health professions and law. Its diverse sources, compendious notes,
brisk editing, and pragmatic orientation make it the single most useful
volume I know of for the health lawyer.
Curran and Shapiro's work is more than a casebook. While most
casebooks contain long excerpts from appellate decisions followed by a few
questions of mainly theoretical significance, Curran and Shapiro's ex-
cerpts are short and well-edited. They are followed by copious notes on
subsequent cases, statutes, legal writings, medical journal reports, and em-
pirical studies. The authors have included a useful array of materials not
usually accessible to lawyers beginning work in the health field. These
include a description of the hospital industry, a glossary of medical terms,
sample medical reports, typical hospital forms, professional codes of ethics,
and medical journal writings.
The organization of Law, Medicine, and Forensic Science is also well-
conceived, particularly for the practicing professional. The chapters, top-
ics, and notes are arranged almost in treatise form, so that locating au-
thorities on particular subjects is made easy. In all respects, this is an
exceptionally fine contribution to the health law field.
3. W. CURRAN & E. SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE, AND FORENSIC SCIENCE (3d ed. 1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited by page number only].
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I.
In considering many of the issues with which Law, Medicine, and Fo-
rensic Science deals, it is helpful to bear in mind the depth of the conflict
between medicine and law. Curran and Shapiro wisely begin by examin-
ing the "dialogue between these too often divergent and conflicting fields
of human endeavor."4 Anyone who works in health law or policy must be
struck by the bitter, multi-issue battle between health care provid-
ers-especially doctors-and lawyers. George Bernard Shaw said that
every profession is a conspiracy against the laity. Lawyers and doctors at
times appear to believe that the others' profession is a conspiracy against
sweet reason itself.
The legal-medical conflict can be seen at many levels. It begins with the
epistemological premises of each profession about what is knowable and
how the knowable can be learned. Since the Greeks, philosophy has been
cleaved by the distinction between rationalists and empiricists, or more
crudely, between a deductive and an inductive approach to deriving con-
clusions. Physicians, having been trained as scientists, are generally em-
piricist in orientation and inductive in reasoning. They proceed from
clinical observations to hypotheses, to diagnoses, to treatments, and finally
to revised or confirmed conclusions based on the results of treatment. Be-
cause patients are so biologically diverse, and their needs so often exigent,
physicians have little respect for operational rules per se, believing that
treatments are validated by the results with particular patients.
Lawyers, on the other hand, are rationalists-at least by aspiration.
They respect facts greatly and spend most of their time assembling them.
But in their intellectual orientation, lawyers are deductive. They begin
with preexisting principles of law and analyze whether the facts of a given
situation justify the application of one or more of these principles. Most
lawyers believe that facts and people can and ought to be made to adhere
to rules, and that exceptions bear a heavy burden of justification.
Lawyers and doctors also begin with different views of human nature
and society. Medicine is more deterministic, while law stresses free will
and responsibility. Doctors conceive of their profession as altruistic; their
world view is based on voluntary devotion to duty rather than obligatory
obedience to rules. Lawyers, in contrast, live in a Hobbesian universe.
They tend to see society as inherently chaotic, restrained only by the rule
of law. Indeed, at times they seem to believe that no significant role in
society-including any health profession-can honorably be discharged
unless it is strictly constrained by legal rules.
4. P. 1.
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Particularly in courtroom situations, doctors and lawyers find one an-
other vexatious. Lawyers are passionately devoted to the notion that truth
will emerge only if each side clearly states its position and vigorously at-
tacks the other. In court, they prey on the popular misconception of sci-
ence as a set of immutable laws established by objective, indisputable ob-
servations. Against this fanciful model it is easy to impeach the qualified
and fallible testimony of any mortal physician.
Physicians are disinclined to state bald conclusions and prefer simply to
describe their findings. In their view, "[tihe adversary system squeezes the
doctor into roles and settings with which he is unfamiliar and in which he
is ineffective . . . ." As a result, the adversary process "is clearly ineffec-
tive in establishing truth in medicine." 5 Doctors' views of court procedures
recall H.L. Mencken's comment that in a courtroom, Jesus Christ and
Judas Iscariot stand as equals-except that the betting odds favor Judas.6
This tension between the medical-scientific and legal perspectives, be-
tween pragmatic solutions and imperative rules, charges many of the cen-
tral issues in health law which Curran and Shapiro examine.
II.
I will discuss only a small sample of the issues which this book ad-
dresses: problems of forensic proof, regulation of the health industry, in-
formed consent to medical treatment, and antitrust law and the health
field.
A. Problems of Forensic Proof
Curran and Shapiro outline clearly the opportunities and difficulties in
using science to prove biomedical facts in litigation. One can begin with a
corollary to Karl Popper's point that scientific hypotheses cannot be con-
clusively proven, only disproven, since we can never be sure that no con-
trary case exists. Thus, in criminal cases "logically, at least, [it is] easier
to prove innocence than guilt." 7 Proof of innocence requires only one
piece of credible alibi evidence, while proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt requires a mass of evidence that excludes successively every plausi-
ble inference except guilt.
The scientific community is energetically trying to convince the public
that science is not simple and pristine, that its laws are not certain and
immutable. A number of scientific fields are becoming increasingly proba-
5. P. 19 (quoting Child, Lawyers, Doctors and Medical Malpractice: A Surgeon Reacts, in MEDI.
CAL MALPRACTICE 56 (Personal Injury Library No. 3, 1966)).
6. PETER'S QUOTATIONS 288 (L. Peter ed. 1977).
7. P. 92 (quoting Walls, Whither Forensic Science?, 6 MED., SCl., & L. 183, 187 (1966)).
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bilistic. It has been said that "communication from science to law, which
was never easy, is being made more difficult by this developing trend to-
wards scientific results being expressed as probabilities. . .. " The law,
scientists complain, wants sure answers and not mere probabilities. In
fairness, however, the law is rarely so inflexible. In virtually every state,
the standard that medical testimony must meet in order to be probative is
not certainty but only "a reasonable degree of medical certainty."' The
standards of "preponderance of the evidence," "clear and convincing
proof," and "beyond a reasonable doubt" have been described at times by
reference to percentages of certainty, such as fifty-one percent, seventy-five
percent, and ninety-five percent, respectively. Increasingly it is recognized
that many legal decisions may properly rest on probabilities.10
As Curran and Shapiro make clear, in recent years a growing list of
scientific techniques has been proffered for use in the courtroom." The
judicial response to these techniques frequently has been skeptical or even
hostile. The opposition to their use is based on several recurring argu-
ments: that a particular scientific test is unreliable; that if reliable it is
nevertheless susceptible to misinterpretation; that even if properly inter-
preted, it will be weighed too heavily by the jury; and that even if prop-
erly weighed, it is unacceptably intrusive or unethical. As a New York
court said in denying admission of a chemical analysis of blood residues
on a defendant's clothes:
This Court cannot stress too much its fear of undue prejudice to
defendant in the receipt of this questionably accepted scientific testi-
mony. . . . The admission of this testimony, with a seeming scien-
tific imprimatur, pointing to female blood on defendant's jacket...
would in the Court's view be highly prejudicial to the defendant, far
outweighing its probative value.1"
Some early California cases on the use of blood group testing for deter-
mining paternity sought to mitigate this problem by admitting the test
only on the same grounds as other expert testimony and leaving the jury
8. Pp. 92-93.
9. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 309 N.W.2d 404, 413-14 (Iowa 1981); Commonwealth v. Webb, 449
Pa. 490, 495, 296 A.2d 734, 737 (1972).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Brilmayer &
Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978);
Gerjuoy, The Relevance of Probability Theory to Problems of Relevance, 18 JURIMETRICS J. 1
(1977); McCauliff, Burdens of Proofk Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guar-
antees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293 (1982); Stripinis, Probability Theory and Circumstantial Evidence:
Implications from a Mathematical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 59 (1981).
11. These include polygraph tests, hypnosis, voice stress analysis, voice prints (spectrograms),
narcoanalysis, neutron activation analysis, breathalyzer tests for intoxication, and blood group tests
and serology.
12. People v. Alston, 79 Misc. 2d 1077, 1087-88, 362 N.Y.S.2d 356, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
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free to weigh the evidence as it wished.1" More recently, courts and gov-
ernment agencies have taken the view that undisputed biological laws
should not be disregarded.14 In a pivotal decision, Judge Charles Joiner
admitted testimony concerning a polygraph examination, saying:
The Court must always be alert to prevent the use of evidence that
has marginal utility in the process of truth seeking if it is of such a
nature so as to over-impress the jury. . . . [Nevertheless,] the rele-
vancy of the polygraph evidence is high and its use will likely protect
both society and the defendant. 15
Several cases go beyond the core question of whether particular scien-
tific tests are reliable; they ask whether the use of even reliable tests may
lead to a "dehumanizing" or "unethical" search for information. As one
judge floridly warned, "[the polygraph] would bring closer the spectre of
'Big Brotherism'. . . . [It] threatens to impair human dignity . . . by
treating the defendant . . . as an object to be operated upon, [and] tested
in a laboratory."16 Curran and Shapiro dryly observe that "[s]cientific
challenge to the courts' traditional methods of determining truth seems
. . . to bring out judicial hyperbole and vivid imagery."17 Nevertheless,
because of the significance of such concerns, most courts still reject poly-
graph testimony, narcoanalysis (statements made under the influence of
truth serum), and hypnosis evidence, absent a stipulation of the parties.
There is no doubt that some forensic techniques loom as especially for-
bidding because they apparently wrest a defendant's own testimony from
him in violation of the spirit of the Fifth Amendment. Other tests, such as
voiceprints and forensic dentistry (bitemark evidence), do not pose such
sensitive philosophical problems and accordingly have enjoyed wider ac-
ceptance. Still other tests, such as neutron activation analysis, are applied
only to extrinsic physical evidence and suggest few of the ethical hazards
that dominate the debate over forensic use of scientific tests. Moreover,
tests such as voiceprints are used primarily in criminal cases, while the
polygraph is controversial in part because it is used in a far more troub-
ling array of employment, insurance, and other extrajudicial contexts. As
Curran and Shapiro's detailed discussion suggests, scientific tests will play
13. See, e.g., S.D.W. v. Holden, 275 Cal. App. 2d 313, 80 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1969); Berry v. Chap-
lin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946).
14. See pp. 155-56 (citing court case and administrative rules making blood test results conclusive
where paternity is ruled out).
15. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 95-96 (E.D. Mich. 1972). Nevertheless, most
courts still exclude polygraph evidence in criminal cases.
16. People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 421, 424, 255 N.W.2d 171, 201, 202 (1977) (Coleman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
17. P. 166.
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an increasingly prominent role both in trials and in extrajudicial proceed-
ings. Inevitably, the debate over their legitimate use will intensify in the
coming years.
B. Regulation in the Health Industry
Because of the enormous growth of regulation in the health field, the
third edition of Law, Medicine, and Forensic Science contains a new
chapter on this subject. Health care, and particularly hospitals, are among
the most highly regulated businesses in our economy. 8 What is less recog-
nized, especially when the debate is reduced to polemical phrases such as
"deregulation," is that the health industry is regulated in more diverse
ways than most other industries. Health care regulation is ecumenical; it
serves ethical, sociological, economic, quality-control, fiscal, and enforce-
ment objectives, at times in contradictory ways.
The most prominent forms of health regulation are limits on the supply
of physicians through state medical licensing laws and visa restrictions on
foreign medical graduates; limits on the supply of hospitals and expensive
equipment through health planning and certificate-of-need laws; regula-
tion of interspecialty competition through medical practice laws, third-
party payor rules, and hospital staff privileges; regulation of prices
through hospital rate setting, reimbursement regulations, and cost-con-
tainment rules; regulation of health facility standards through "conditions
of participation" for Medicare/Medicaid and rules set by the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals; regulation of physician conduct
through Professional Standards Review Organizations, peer review and
mandatory reporting laws; regulation of medical ethics in research and
experimental treatment through mandatory Institutional Review Boards;
indirect regulation of certain conventional biomedical techniques (such as
CAT scans, heart transplants, and "less-than-effective" drugs) through di-
rect reimbursement policies; and direct regulation of special biomedical
technologies such as recombinant DNA research, psychosurgery, and in
vitro fertilization.
Many of these constraints serve different goals and employ different
techniques than classical economic regulation. They do not simply seek to
correct market defects such as the existence of economic externalities or
gaps in consumer information. They do not fit neatly into either the "pub-
lic interest" or the "regulatory capture" models of regulation. 9 Yet they
serve widely felt needs, some of which are unique to the health care field.
18. See Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 2, at 82.
19. See Reynolds, Prospects for Regulation of the Health Care Sector in the 1980s, in AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASS'N, PROFILE OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 1981, at 37 (D. Goldfarb ed.).
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The problems of whether and how to regulate the costs and quality of
health care are among the most challenging in our economic life.
Perhaps as a result, the regulation of health care in America has been
subject to contradictory and shifting regulatory philosophies. The Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (formerly HEW), for example, first
tried to increase the aggregate supply of physicians through "capitation"
grants to medical schools, to increase the number of hospitals through the
Hill-Burton program, and to improve the quality of care by strict condi-
tions of participation and generous reimbursement rules under Medicare
and Medicaid. Access to health services and quality of care were the over-
riding concerns. As health costs skyrocketed and economic theories
changed, however, the goal of cost containment became paramount. The
capitation grants were phased out; health planning laws were enacted to
limit hospital construction; and tighter reimbursement rules were
fashioned.
Meanwhile, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) operated on a very
different economic theory of the health industry, and it underwent its own
ideological metamorphosis. The FTC moved from zealous regulation to
"occupational deregulation" of health professions. The Commission basi-
cally accepted the theory that physicians "induce" demand for their ser-
vices in order to achieve "target incomes." While HEW viewed profes-
sional practice rules as promoting quality of care, the FTC saw them as
unjustified restraints of trade that protected poor quality care by some
professionals. While HEW saw continuity of care and preventive health
services as key considerations, the FTC sought through "occupational de-
regulation" to fractionate care into its most efficient economic units (for
example, having dental care provided by independent and competing hy-
gienists, extended function dental assistants, dentists, endodontists, and
orthodontists). While HEW believed physicians' participation was crucial
to cost-containment efforts, the FTC sought to reduce drastically physi-
cian participation on Blue Shield plan governing bodies.
Although HEW and the FTC have sometimes worked harmoniously
(for example, in developing the Model Drug Product Selection Act and in
encouraging HMO development), their divergent perspectives are sympto-
matic of the basic problem of health care regulation: Almost everyone
agrees that the economics of health care are unusual, but few can agree on
what to do about it. The neoclassical model of a competitive market as-
sumes that there are many sellers who act relatively independently and
without regulation, that consumers are well informed about prices and are
able to judge quality, that competition drives prices down to average cost
levels, and that if prices fall below marginal (or average) costs, factors of
production move to other lines of business. This model is, however,
210
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largely inapplicable to our current health care system. A great deal of
basic empirical research is still being brought to bear on the most funda-
mental economic issues in health care.20 In this unsettled theoretical envi-
ronment, it is not surprising that conflicting regulatory policies persist.
Curran and Shapiro's chapter on regulation introduces many of the sig-
nificant trends in health care regulation: state licensing of a growing num-
ber of health professions; tougher self-policing of competence and ethics
by the professions themselves; greater constraints on physician conduct;
growing judicial review of hospital staff privileges and other hospital
management decisions; increasing use of formalized peer review and risk
management programs; frequent litigation over certificates of need and li-
censure; and persistent demands that hospitals .act like charities (for exam-
ple, by providing emergency care to all who need it) while they are regu-
lated like businesses. Curran and Shapiro capture the ongoing tensions in
health care regulation. These include the complex interplay among rules,
quality of care, and health costs, and the need to apply the rigors of the
competitive market to an industry which still operates with a strong altru-
istic ethos.
0. Informed Consent to Treatment
Curran and Shapiro explore not only the usual contexts in which im-
portant legal doctrines may be applied, but the less obvious ones as well.
For example, while most authors discuss the doctrine of infQrmed consent
to health care only in the context of consent to surgery or psychiatric care,
Curran and Shapiro also discuss it with reference to immunization and
vaccination programs, the Food and Drug Administration's proposal for
"patient package inserts" to prescription drugs, and medical experimenta-
tion. Informed consent is shown to be a slippery concept whose shape
changes with the context. The section on informed consent begins with
Justice Blackmun's rudimentary definition of such consent as "the giving
of information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its
consequences." 2' This is followed by the question, "Do you find Justice
Blackmun's definition adequate?"2 2 The point, of course, is that such a
formulation of informed consent does not provide any role for the patient
and does not capture the varying meanings of informed consent in various
contexts.
20. See Sloan, Competition Among Physicians, in FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, COMPETITION IN
THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 57 (W. Greenberg ed. 1978). But see
Gaffney, Cotterill & Meeker, Competitive Forces in the Market for Physicians' Services: A Survey of
Current Research, in AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, supra note 19, at 3.
21. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976).
22. P. 411.
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In recent years, the debate over informed consent has swung from the
practical toward the philosophical. This change may have been a useful
corrective to the many years during which the doctrine of informed con-
sent was an article of faith without articulated content. But that situation
changed dramatically during the 1970's, as a series of thoughtful writers
focused on honesty and lying in medical relations, on the ethical obliga-
tions of physicians, and on the meanings of "voluntary" and "substituted"
consent when patients are impaired."3 Our understanding of informed
consent therefore has become more sophisticated.
It has become clear that the questions which must now be answered are
intensely practical and empirical. What risks are sufficiently predictable to
be properly revealed? What are the psychological and physiological costs
of revealing remote risks to fragile patients? How do patients' minds re-
ceive, "encode," and retrieve information concerning treatment? How
much do patients really understand? As to these questions, there is rela-
tively little empirical information.24 Yet, even the existing body of re-
search makes clear that the doctrine of informed consent-however formu-
lated-frequently does not work the way it should. Several studies have
indicated that a great many patients are told and understand only a small
fraction of the information relevant to their medical decisions.2 5
This disconcerting reality focuses our attention on the fact that legal
informed consent entails two separate questions: Has the physician dis-
charged his duty to disclose adequate information, and has the patient
comprehended enough and engaged in a voluntary decision-making pro-
cess such that his consent can be accepted?
For many years, the law required physicians to disclose to patients only
information that most physicians in the community would have dis-
closed.26 But beginning in 1972 with Canterbury v. Spence,27 some courts
23. See, e.g., S. BOK, LYING (1979); Meisel, Roth & Lidz, Toward a Model of the Legal Doc-
trine of Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 285 (1977); Romano, Reflections on Informed
Consent, 30 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 129 (1974); NATIONAL COMM'N FOR PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979).
24. For some of the existing research, see Cassileth, Zupkis, Sutton-Smith & March, Informed
'Consent- Why Are Its Goals Imperfectly Realized?, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 896 (1980); Grundner,
On the Readability of Surgical Consent Forms, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 900 (1980); Hagman, The
Medical Patient's Right to Know: Report on a Medical-Legal-Ethical Empirical Study, 17 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 758 (1970); Woodward, Informed Consent of Volunteers: A Direct Measurement of Compre-
hension and Retention of Information, 27 CLINICAL RESEARCH 248 (1979).
25. See, e.g., Meisel & Roth, What We Do and Do Not Know About Informed Consent, 246 J.
A.M.A. 2473 (1981); NATIONAL COMM'N FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING THOSE INSTITUTIONALIZED AS MENTALLY IN-
FIRM (1978); see also Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally
I11, 20 HARV. J. LEGIS. (1983) (forthcoming) (summarizing studies on informed consent to psychiatric
and other medical care).
26. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 190, 354 P.2d 670, 673 (1960).
27. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For a summary of developments after Canterbury, see Sard v.
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rejected the notion that the medical profession could set its own standard
of disclosure and held instead that a physician has a "duty to impart in-
formation which the patient has every right to expect."2" Thus, the "pa-
tient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal."' 9
Risks must be disclosed if a reasonable person in the position of the pa-
tient "would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks
in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy." 0 The inquiry
was still focused on what the physician disclosed, not on what the patient
understood or decided.
The problem remains of devising a viable model of informed consent
that does focus on the patient's mental processes but that is also workable
in the context of urgent hospital decisions. Hospital staff cannot all be
turned into psychiatrists, priests, or oracles forced to guess what has pene-
trated the deep recesses of a patient's understanding or what myriad fac-
tors have influenced his decision. They are, after all, under legal and ethi-
cal obligations to act-often quickly-based on what is medically
necessary for the patient, unless the patient competently declines.
Curran and Shapiro underscore how broad and sometimes problematic
the doctrine of informed consent can be by juxtaposing Canterbury v.
Spence with Truman v. Thomas."1 In the latter case, the California Su-
preme Court reversed a jury verdict for the defendant physician on the
ground that the physician had a duty not only to advise his patient to have
a pap smear test, but also to lecture her repeatedly on the risks if she
persisted in refusing to undergo the test. As the dissent pointed out:
Carried to its logical end, the majority decision requires physicians
to explain to patients who have not had a recent general examination
the intricacies of chest examinations, blood analyses, X-ray examina-
tions, electrocardiograms, urine analyses and innumerable other pro-
cedures . . . . Requiring physicians to spend a large portion of their
time teaching medical science before practicing it will greatly in-
crease the cost of medical diagnosis-a cost ultimately paid by an
unwanting public. Persons desiring treatment for specific complaints
will be deterred from seeking medical advice once they realize they
will be charged not only for treatment but also for lengthy lectures
on the merits of their examination.32
Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 367 A.2d 525 (1977). Most states adhere to the pre-Canterbury rule.
28. 464 F.2d at 782.
29. Id. at 786.
30. Id. at 787 (quoting Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent To Therapy, 64 NW. U.L. REV.
628, 640 (1970)).
31. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
32. Id. at 298-99, 611 P.2d at 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 316 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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Although this is an extreme case, the doctrine of informed consent does
remain an unsatisfactory compromise between ethical aspirations and the
realistic limits of human communication and economic life. Curran and
Shapiro reveal the ambiguities and problems of this doctrine.
D. Antitrust Law and the Health Industry
Although Curran and Shapiro's section on antitrust in the health field
is not very long or detailed, it is of great interest because of the rapid pace
of legal developments in this area. It has been estimated that more than
five times as many antitrust suits have challenged conduct in the health
field since 1975 as in the previous eighty-five years."3 This flood of litiga-
tion has been spurred not only by dynamic expansion in the health indus-
try and aggressive competition among health providers, payors, and pro-
fessionals, but also by changes in the prevailing legal doctrines. Recently,
the Supreme Court and lower courts have systematically expanded the
bases for antitrust suits in the health field and have cut back on the avail-
able defenses. They have held that virtually any hospital affects interstate
commerce sufficiently to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the anti-
trust laws,3 4 truncated the "learned professions" exemption, 5 narrowed
the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption for the "business of insurance" as
applied to health care reimbursement plans,' ruled that health planning
laws do not confer absolute antitrust immunity, 7 and narrowly construed
the Parker v. Brown8 defense based on state authorization. 9
Consequently, there has been increasingly brisk antitrust activity in sev-
eral health areas, including challenges to hospital staff privileges,4 physi-
cian efforts to discourage development of HMOs,41 other alleged restraints
33. Halper, The Health Care Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Collision Course, 49 ANTITRUST
L.J. 17 (1980).
34. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
35. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982); National Soe'y
of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975).
36. See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. 1422 (1982) (mem.); Group Health
Ass'n v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue
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40. See, e.g., Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
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of trade by professional associations,"2 insurer-provider prepayment agree-
ments,"3 hospital mergers,"" and the use of "relative value guides." '45 Sev-
eral other areas can be expected to become fertile fields of antitrust activ-
ity, including multi-institutional, purchasing and shared service
arrangements, professional accreditation activities, physician prepayment
plans, and the actions of private "coalitions for health care."
A recurring problem in health antitrust cases is whether a professional
group's competitive actions can be separated from its quality control or
cost-containment efforts. Curran and Shapiro examine this issue through
the leading case of Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society."' In
that case two foundations for medical care (FMCs) and two county medi-
cal societies agreed to set by majority vote the maximum fees that member
physicians could claim as full reimbursement for services to policyholders
of participating insurance plans. The district court and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit refused to conclude that such conduct was a
per se violation. On the basis of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar"" and
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,'8 the Ninth
Circuit concluded that "marketing restraints that regulate professional
competition may pass muster under the Rule of Reason even though simi-
lar restraints on ordinary business competition would not.""' It was con-
ceded that the FMCs' maximum fees were below the state's own maxi-
mum reimbursement level for workmen's compensation and other
programs. There was only weak evidence that fees were raised, were uni-
form, or were coercively enforced. And, as the district court found, an
anticompetitive purpose had not been proven. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
professed bewilderment because "in truth, we know very little about the
impact of this and many other agreements within the health care indus-
try," and "we are uncertain about the competitive order that should exist
Medical Serv. Corp., [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,195 (F.T.C. Sept.
15, 1976).
42. See, e.g., Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
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1981); Bunzel v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 107 Cal. App. 3d 165, 165 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1980).
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within the health care industry. "50
The Supreme Court later reversed the Ninth Circuit in a 4-3 decision.
It affixed the term "price fixing" to the challenged activity and concluded
that it was illegal per se, despite arguments that "the per se rule did not
govern this case because the agreements at issue . . . fix maximum prices,
are among members of a profession, are in an industry with which the
judiciary has little antitrust experience, and are alleged to have procompe-
titive justifications. 51
In the context of traditional antitrust doctrine, the result in Maricopa
County is not surprising. But the opinion left a confusing and disturbing
residue for the health industry. Although the FMCs performed important
peer review and administrative tasks, and although the Court conceded
that the impact of the fee maxima on medical fees in general was "a mat-
ter of dispute," 52 it nevertheless boldly declared that the "price fixing
agreements in this case . . . are not premised on public service or ethical
norms."5 Although maximum rather than uniform fees were set, the
Court concluded that the plans would "provide the same economic re-
wards to all practitioners. '54 The Court then ventured that "even if a fee
schedule is . . . desirable, it is not necessary that doctors do the price
fixing."55 It apparently preferred that insurers limit prices, although the
Court did not offer any persuasive reason for this preference. Finally, al-
though the court of appeals had stated flatly that "this record reveals
nothing about actual competitive effects of the challenged arrangement,"'5'
the Supreme Court, in a series of observations couched in phrases such as
"it is entirely possible," and "there is no reason to believe," speculated on
what the competitive impacts might be. One is left with the uneasy sense
that the Court has made broader than necessary law from questionable
policy judgments. In doing so, it may have prematurely foreclosed a range
of procompetitive, cost-containment measures that the health industry and
consumers sorely need. This decision highlights the fact that the science of
applying antitrust principles to the unique economics of health care is in
only a rudimentary stage of development.
Centripetal forces now at work in the health industry are likely to exac-
erbate the conflicts between antitrust principles and concerns over quality
and cost. The demand for health care increases while resources are ever
more limited. Providers continue to compete largely on the basis of quality
50. Id. at 556.
51. 102 S. Ct. at 2472.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2475.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2477.
56. 643 F.2d at 556.
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rather than price, while the need for cost containment becomes more
acute. The growth of hospital management companies and multi-institu-
tional arrangements, service specialization, exclusive service contracts,
tight capital markets for new facilities, and intensified competition for re-
imbursement among provider and physician groups, are additional factors
that may lead to an increase in antitrust litigation.
As Curran and Shapiro recognize, antitrust suits are a revealing aspect
of the transformation of health care from a genteel discipline governed by
its own code of conduct into an industry capable of surviving in a strin-
gent economy.57 Whether this transformation is good or bad remains to be
seen. If antitrust law is sensibly applied, it might help the health industry
to become a more efficient enterprise, better able to serve patients' needs.
III.
Like all compendious works, the third edition of Curran and Shapiro's
Law, Medicine, and Forensic Science has some flaws. For example, the
section on medical malpractice is excessively long, as compared with more
cursory sections on reimbursement issues and health planning. The poten-
tially novel section on international health is devoted to pedestrian World
Health Organization documents and treaties. It might better have dis-
cussed, for example, the growing international trade in biomedical ser-
vices. The book does not give the reader much insight into several key
developments in the health industry, such as the growth of hospital chains,
the ways in which reimbursement rules favor high-technology health ser-
vices, the economic rationale for hospital cost-containment or certificate of
need restraints, or the problems of adverse-selection and cost-shifting in
health insurance. It also does not deal with the critical field of environ-
mental and occupational health, although Three Mile Island, cotton dust,
and Love Canal are of great public interest and legal significance.
For a book which does so much so well, however, these are very mild
criticisms. Curran and Shapiro have chosen as their subject a field that is
economically intricate, ethically subtle, and legally complex. They expose
its complexities and suggest its theoretical depths, while at the same time
providing a useful tool for practicing professionals.
57. Pp. 692-94.
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